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Abstract
Limited studies have examined the effect of feedback sensitivity and intrinsic motivation on
cognitive performance. The present study serves as a pilot project for a study at the University of
Tennessee at Chattanooga that examines the modulating role of external, monetary reward
incentives and cognitive intrinsic motivation on cognitive control. For the present study, the
relationship among cognitive performance outcomes (reaction time and accuracy) on an adapted
Stimulus Reward Association Stroop Task will be explored. Two main hypotheses were tested in
the present study: H1 Reaction time on congruent trials will be significantly faster than reaction
time on incongruent trials. H2 Accuracy on congruent trials will be significantly greater than
accuracy on incongruent trials. Implications from the findings of this study will provide a
foundation for future examinations of the motivational factors and feedback conditions that
affect cognitive performance.
Keywords: Cognitive Control, Cognitive Effort, Intrinsic Motivation, Feedback
Sensitivity, Stroop Task

“A Penny for Your Thoughts:” Developing an Adapted Stimulus Reward Association –
Stroop Task to Assess the Impact of Individual Difference Factors on Cognitive Control

Cognitive control refers to the role of varying dimensions of executive function (EF) in
regulation of attention, memory, and behavioral outputs oriented towards completion of a task
(Botvinick & Braver 2015). In a contextualized scenario, a working professional intends to
complete a written manuscript before the upcoming deadline. At times, this individual is able to
implement effective strategies for directing their attention towards completion of the manuscript.
However, they are intermittently distracted by emails, initiating conversations with co-workers,
and surveying any updates on their Instagram feed. The person diverts their attention to these
secondary activities, under the reasoning that a break is justified after long hours in the office
setting. Later, the person re-directs their attention to completion of the manuscript, as the
deadline is fast-approaching and proficient work could yield long term professional
advancement. This brief vignette of a working professional demonstrates an application of
cognitive control, where this individual needed to inhibit routine behavioral responses that
directly conflicted with their goal-oriented behavior. When those circumstances occurred, there
was opposition between automatic or impulsive behaviors and those that are goal-oriented. This
opposition is referred to as cognitive conflict and presents a scenario where cognitive control is
needed to attenuate task-irrelevant factors in favor of task-relevant ones (Abrahamse et al.,
2013).
Underlying cognitive control are dual mechanisms of control: proactive control and
reactive control (Braver & Burgess, 2008). Through goal-activation and maintenance, proactive
cognitive control selects for task-relevant information prior to initiation of a cognitively-

demanding task. Reactive control differs in that it utilizes conflict detection, response inhibition,
and resolution after a cognitively-demanding task has occurred (Mäki-Marttunen et al., 2019).
To demonstrate proactive and reactive control in a scenario, an undergraduate student needs to
stop for gas on their drive home from campus. This individual establishes exiting the interstate to
receive gas as prior selection for a goal-oriented behavior, where the execution of this plan is
guided by proactive control. However, the student often drives to their house from campus
without making any stops, which creates a conflict between the automatic, routine behavior of
driving home and the goal-oriented behavior of making an additional stop. Based on this
scenario, proactive control integrated the task-relevant selection of stopping for gas through
preparatory attention, while reactive control characterized resolving the cognitive conflict
between the routine drive and the goal of stopping (Braver & Burgess, 2008).
Stroop Task
Assessment of cognitive proactive and reactive control can be done within the welldocumented conflict paradigm of the Stroop Color and Word Test (Stroop, 1935). Often referred
to as the Stroop task, this task involves individuals stating the ink color of a presented word. The
words in the Stroop task are color words, like blue, green, red, and yellow but they are also
presented in colored text. The words can be presented in a congruent color (“GREEN”) or an
incongruent color (“GREEN”). For each word, individuals must exert cognitive control and
disregard the semantic meaning of the written word. Therefore, a correct response to the trial
(“GREEN”) would be red, as that is the ink color of the word, and not green, the actual word that
is written. The Stroop task induces a high level of cognitive conflict as it requires inhibition of
information that is usually needed (the semantic meaning) and instead requires modulating
attention towards the usually unneeded, but now task-relevant, information of the ink color.

Proactive control, in context of the Stroop task, mediates the extent of cognitive conflict
by applying the rules of the task instructions. In this way proactive control sets the goal-oriented
behavior and selects, early on, the task-relevant information. Specifically, this means that when
individuals use proactive control on the Stroop task, they focus their attention on preparing for
incongruence in ink color and semantic meaning (Abrahamse et al., 2013). In comparison,
reactive control is unrelated to early selection or preparatory attention for cognitive conflict. This
mechanism mediates cognitive conflict just after being presented a stimulus (Braver, 2012).
Therefore, reactive control happens between the presentation of a trial and the individual’s
response.
Previous findings from the Stroop task exhibit relatively consistent results across reaction
time and accuracy in participant performance, enough to be termed the Stroop effect. A
replication study of the Stroop Effect in Nepal examined 30 healthy male students for reaction
time across congruent (“RED”) and incongruent (“RED”) conditions in the classical Stroop
design (Ghimire et al., 2014). The reaction times for both conditions demonstrated a significant
increase in reaction time for the incongruent condition, in comparison to the congruent condition.
Further, accuracy was examined across both congruence conditions in this sample. The results
exhibited 0 errors in the congruent condition, while 60% of participants made 1 or more errors in
the incongruent condition. Therefore, the empirical study demonstrated a slower reaction time
and a decreased accuracy for incongruent trials, in comparison to congruent trials (Ghimire et al.,
2014). These findings are consistent with the overall predicted effect of the Stroop task, as first
demonstrated by John Ridley Stroop in 1935, where it was noted that participants responded
slower and less accurately to presentations of incongruence in word color and meaning (Stroop,
1935).

Further, the effects of both accuracy and reaction time can be examined by the presence
of a speed-accuracy tradeoff (Wylie et al., 2009). This strategic method for completing a
cognitively demanding task is examined through the level of accuracy on the speed of
completion. For example, a corporate data analyst may favor an increase in precision and
accuracy when inputting data points, at the expense of fast task completion. Therefore, this
strategic approach to a task can inversely increase accuracy (fewer errors) at the cost of speed or
increase speed at the cost of accuracy (greater errors). This speed-accuracy tradeoffs can be
consciously chosen by the individual, or serve as an underlying mechanism affecting accuracy
outcomes. In the Stroop effect, increased accuracy demonstrates a tradeoff for slower reaction
time across both the congruent and incongruent conditions.
Feedback Sensitivity
Demanding tasks, like the Stroop task, require substantial and elongated attention
modulation, working memory (WM), and cognitive control (Kool et al., 2012). This cost for
initiating and maintaining goal-orientation through both proactive control and reactive control is
in direct relationship with the associated benefit of the task goal (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). To
elaborate, the interaction between cost and benefit serves as a cognitive tradeoff between the cost
of maintaining proactive and reactive control mechanisms in cognitively demanding tasks in
relation to the level of perceived benefit (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). This cognitive cost, higher
with increasing levels of cognitive conflict, can be mitigated by the presentation of an extrinsic
reward, like receiving positive feedback (Scott et al., 2015). Feedback sensitivity can thus be
examined in relation to cognitive control, but it may not be the only important factor, as
cognitive intrinsic motivation may also interact with the relationship. However, this relationship
will not be explored in the analysis of the present study, but the conditions of feedback and no-

feedback are present in the adapted Stroop task used in the experiment. The establishment of
whether the present task first replicates the expected results of the Stroop task will allow for
further exploration into this relationship.
Cognitive Intrinsic Motivation
The willingness to exude cognitive effort, and the associated personal value associated
with this effort, is defined as cognitive intrinsic motivation (Inzlicht et al., 2018). Cognitive
intrinsic motivation can be assessed by the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale, which examines this
individual trait disposition across an 18-item questionnaire (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). On
this scale, an individual who scores high is considered to have a significantly greater value
associated with cognitive effort, in contrast to an individual who scores lower. In the presence of
an external incentive, individuals who have lower NFC scores increase their cognitive effort
(Sandra & Otto, 2018). However, the presence of external incentive led to a decrease in cognitive
effort for individuals with higher NFC scores. These findings suggest that for those with lower
NFC scores, or a lower amount of value attributed to cognitive effort, poor performance on
cognitive tasks can be mitigated by the presence of an external incentive. Further, those with
higher NFC scores are less impacted, if at all, by the presence of external incentive. This may be
due to their perception of the ratio of task cost to benefit not being significantly altered with an
additional, external source of motivation. With this finding in mind, it is possible that
individual’s cognitive intrinsic motivation can further inform the relationship between reactive
control in cognitive performance on the Stroop task in the presence or absence of feedback. This
relationship will not be explored in the analysis of the present study, but the findings from this
research will allow for future analysis into the effect of cognitive intrinsic motivation on Stroop
task performance.

Purpose of the Present Study
The present study serves as a pilot project for a study at the University of Tennessee at
Chattanooga that examines the modulating roles of external, monetary reward incentives and
cognitive intrinsic motivation on cognitive control in a conflict paradigm, an adapted StimulusReward Association (SRA) Stroop Task. For the present study, an adapted Stroop task was
designed to integrate feedback, and eventually reward conditions, into the classic design of
Stroop Color and Word Test (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). This Stimulus-Reward
Association (SRA) Stroop task retains all the same characteristics of the classic Stroop design,
assessing the impact of congruency on cognitive performance across reaction time, accuracy, and
a speed-accuracy tradeoff. The establishment that the Stroop effect is replicated in the adapted
Stimulus-Reward Association Stroop task is necessary for later analysis into the effects of
individual difference factors across feedback sensitivity and cognitive intrinsic motivation.
For the purpose of the present study, the following questions were explored: 1) What is
the impact of word/color congruency on reaction time in an adapted SRA Stroop Task? and 2)
What is the impact of word/color congruency on accuracy in an adapted SRA Stroop Task?
Specifically, I hypothesized that the typical Stroop effects, where accuracy is greater and
reaction time is faster on congruent trials than on incongruent trials, will be replicated with the
adapted SRA-Stroop Task.
Method
Participants
Student participants (N = 10) were recruited from the University of Tennessee at
Chattanooga by means of direct recruitment. For this pilot study, only a small sample size was
assessed to determine whether the development of the adapted SRA-Stroop task replicates the

typical effect in a classic Stroop task design. Participants were excluded from the study if they
indicated any history of color deficiency or other condition(s) that would affect visual ability.
Participants were also excluded if they had sustained a concussion within the last 90 days. No
incentives were given for participation in this study.
Measures
Need for Cognition Scale
The Need for Cognition scale is an 18-item questionnaire that was used in this study as a
measure of cognitive intrinsic motivation. The NFC scale measures a participants self-reported
enjoyment of engaging with cognitively demanding activities (Caccioppo & Petty, 1982). For
this questionnaire, the participant responds to statements like, “I prefer complex to simple
problems” and “I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve” on a 7-point Likert scale.
The Need for Cognition scale is integrated procedurally for the purpose of future study, but will
not be examined in the statistical analyses for the present study.
Stroop Color and Word Test (SCWT)
The Stroop Color and Word Test (SCWT) is a neuropsychological experiment that
measures the role of cognitive control in conflict situations (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010).
The Stroop task requires naming the presented color of a word. On this task the presented color
can be congruent with its semantic meaning (“BLUE”) or incongruent with its semantic meaning
(“BLUE”). For the present study, an adapted Stroop task was presented using SuperLab 5 on an
iMac desktop computer in UTC’s Assessing Cognition Lab. The adapted Stroop task was
modeled after Krebs, Boehler, and Woldorff’s (2010) Stimulus-Reward Association Stroop Task.
In the adapted Stroop task used in this study, participants identified the task-relevant
dimension of naming the presented color of a word in each trial, while ignoring the task-

irrelevant information of the word’s semantic meaning. The words used in this task were:
“RED”, “YELLOW”, “BLUE”, “GREEN”, or “BROWN.” The word “BROWN” served as the
neutral condition. Each color word was presented in one of four colors (“RED”, “YELLOW”,
“BLUE”, or “GREEN”) and each of those colors was assigned a key on the keyboard.
Participants were instructed at the start of the task to respond as accurately and quickly as
possible by pressing the key associated with the presented color of each word within the allotted
time frame. Participant reaction times were recorded for each trial and accuracy was also
calculated.
Each trial within this paradigm began with a fixation square in the center of a black
screen. After a variable time of 500 to 1500 ms, the fixation square was replaced by a color
word. Each word appeared on the screen for 300 ms and participants had up to 1800 - 2200 ms to
respond (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). Any response outside that window was not
recorded. Two of the four presented colors (BLUE and GREEN) were associated with the
potential for symbolic feedback in the form of a check mark symbol for correct responses or a
hashtag symbol (#) for incorrect responses. The other two presented colors (RED and YELLOW)
were not associated with any feedback. The feedback symbol appeared on the screen for 100ms.
After the 100 ms, the next trial began.
The word “BROWN” served as a neutral stimulus. This word was presented in each of
the colors but was not associated with feedback. The presentation of the neutral stimulus
(“BROWN”) was dispersed evenly throughout all trials in the task and served as a baseline for
performance. In total, participants completed four experimental blocks, each consisting of 160
trials. Between each block, participants received four, 20 second, breaks. Over all four blocks,
there were an evenly distributed 320 potential-feedback trials (BLUE and GREEN) and 320 no-

feedback trials (RED and YELLOW). Further breakdown of the distribution of trials is as
follows in Table 1:

Table 1: Proportion of Trials by Congruency and Feedback
FEEDBACK: Total = 320 trials
Congruent, Feedback-related (BLUE or GREEN):

25% of trials

Incongruent, Feedback-related (BLUE or GREEN):

25% of trials

Incongruent, Feedback-unrelated (RED YELLOW RED YELLOW):

25% of trials

Neutral (BROWN or BROWN):

25% of trials

NO FEEDBACK: Total = 320 trials
Congruent (RED or YELLOW):

25% of trials

Incongruent, Feedback-related (GREEN BLUE GREEN BLUE):

25% of trials

Incongruent, Feedback-unrelated (YELLOW or RED):

25% of trials

Neutral (BROWN or BROWN)

25% of trials

Intrinsic Motivation Inventory
The Intrinsic Motivation Inventory is a self-reported questionnaire that evaluates
participants’ subjective experience of an experimental task after it has been completed (Ryan,
1984). The participants in this study completed four subscales of the Intrinsic Motivation
Inventory: Interest/Enjoyment, Effort/Importance, Competence, and Pressure/Tension.
Participants respond on a 7-point Likert scale in terms of their level of agreement to statements
such as, “While I was working on the task I was thinking about how much I enjoyed it” and “I
would describe the task as very enjoyable.” The Intrinsic Motivation Inventory is integrated

procedurally for the purpose of future study, but will not be examined in the statistical analyses
for the present study.
Procedure
Participants met in-person at the UTC Assessing Cognition Lab to complete this study.
They first read and completed the IRB-approved informed consent. Demographic questions and
the Need For Cognition scale were then completed via a QuestionPro administered survey on an
iMac desktop computer within the lab. Upon completion of the Need For Cognition scale, the
adapted SRA-Stroop Task was presented using SuperLab 5. Following that experimental section,
the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory was administered to assess subjective experience. A debrief
on the nature of the experiment was provided to all participants at the conclusion of the study.

Results
To test my hypothesis that accuracy would be greater and reaction time would be faster
on congruent trials than on incongruent trials, I first calculated reaction time and accuracy for
neutral, congruent, and incongruent trials on the adapted SRA Stroop task. Performance on each
trial was categorized as either a hit, miss, or omission. Responses were considered a “hit” when
the participant response was correct and recorded within the allotted time frame. A “miss” was
categorized as a participant incorrectly responding to the presented color of a trial. An
“omission” was categorized when no response was recorded within the allotted time frame.
The reaction time data was examined in terms of color/word congruence (congruent,
incongruent, neutral) and averaged across all ten participants. Means and standard errors for
reaction time on congruent, incongruent, and neutral trials are presented, and the analysis for
average correct RT and average incorrect RT, are included in Table 2.

Table 2: Mean Reaction Time by Trial Congruence
Mean (Standard Error)
RT Overall

Correct RT

Incorrect RT

Congruent

469.9 (14.2)

482.0 (13.7)

439.1 (16.1)

Incongruent

505.2 (15.5)

518.9 (14.0)

479.9 (20.5)

Neutral

489.1 (20.5)

496.7 (14.8)

469.0 (20.8)

As presented above in Table 2 and below in Figure 1, average RTs overall were
significantly faster for congruent trials (“BLUE”) than incongruent trials (“GREEN”), t(9) = 3.81, p = .004. This pattern of results replicates the typical Stroop effect.

Average Response Times by Congruency
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
Congruent

Incongruent

Neutral

Figure 1: Mean reaction time (ms) and standard error for congruent, incongruent, and
neutral conditions in the adapted SRA-Stroop task.

Moreover, a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) demonstrates a main
effect of accuracy such that when participants responded correctly, reaction times were
consistently slower than when participants responded incorrectly, F(1,9) = 21.83, p = .001.
However, this did not interact with the trial congruency type as no significant interaction was

found between accuracy and congruency, F(1,9) = 15.84, p = .003. This pattern of results
replicates a typical speed-accuracy trade-off. Of note is that the difference between correct and
incorrect reactions times is slightly less for neutral trials than for congruent or incongruent trials
but neutral trial RTs were not examined statistically. These differences can be seen below in
Figure 2. Therefore, the presented data analysis of RT in the 10 participants from this pilot
project suggest support for my hypothesis: reaction time (RT) on congruent trials will be faster
than reaction time (RT) on incongruent trials.

Response Times by Accuracy
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
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Average Correct RT

Neutral

Average Incorrect RT

Figure 2: Mean correct and incorrect reaction times (ms) and standard error for congruent,
incongruent, and neutral conditions in the adapted SRA-Stroop task.

In addition to examining reaction times, I also explored how accuracy (hit, miss, or
omission) differed across congruent, incongruent, and neutral conditions. That data is included
below in Table 3.

Table 3: Mean Accuracy by Trial Congruence
Mean Accuracy (Standard Error)
Hit

Miss

Omission

Congruent

55% (3%)

18% (3%)

26% (2%)

Incongruent

45% (1%)

20% (2%)

35% (3%)

Neutral

52% (2%)

18% (3%)

30% (3%)

As presented above in Table 3 and below in Figure 3, participants responded correctly on
congruent trials (“BLUE”) significantly more often than on incongruent trials. (“GREEN”), t(9)
= 3.89, p = .004. Participants also responded correctly on neutral trials more often than on
incongruent trials, but that difference was not examined statistically. Misses were equally as
likely between congruency types. Omissions, trials where a response was not recorded in the
allotted time, were more common for incongruent trials, and least common for congruent trials.
This pattern of results replicates the typical Stroop effect and suggests support for my
hypothesis: accuracy on congruent trials will be significantly greater than accuracy on
incongruent trials.

Accuracy by Congruency
70%

Percent of Trials

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Hit

Miss

Congruent

Incongruent

Omission

Neutral

Figure 3: Accuracy by percentage of hits, misses, or omissions on the congruent,
incongruent, and neutral conditions in the adapted SRA-Stroop task.
Discussion
The results of the present study using an adapted SRA-Stroop task indicate support for
the expected results of a typical Stroop task. The findings supported the two hypotheses of this
study by demonstrating a decrease in reaction time and accuracy for the incongruent condition,
in comparison to the neutral and congruent conditions. Further, a speed-accuracy tradeoff was
exhibited by the slower reaction time for correct responses across all conditions. Therefore, the
expected Stroop effect was replicated in the data analysis of this phase of the study. These
findings suggest that the adapted SRA-Stroop task can be used in future studies to examine the
impacts of feedback sensitivity, extrinsic reward, and cognitive intrinsic motivation on cognitive
control.
Limitations
The primary limitation of the present study is the relatively small sample (n=10)
completing the experiment, which exhibits an inability to sufficiently assess for applicable
statistical significance in data analysis. For the 10 participants in this pilot project, the
demographic questions were not recorded, which serves as a limitation for analyzing the data in
terms of demographics. Further, this phase of the study is limited by the non-representative
sampling method for obtaining participants, through the direct means of recruitment. Moreover,
the sample population of undergraduate students serves as a limitation, where an academic
setting may not demonstrate a representative distribution of cognitive intrinsic motivation or
cognitive performance. Alongside this, undergraduate students fall primarily in the range of 18 to
22 years old, which exhibits a lack of generalizability for the present findings.

In terms of the Stroop Task, extraneous and uncontrolled factors could potentially
influence cognitive control, such as loud noise obstructions from construction outside the
laboratory impeding on the ability to implement effective modulation of attention. Additionally,
the presence of the experimenter in the lab setting could have integrated an additional socialperceived pressure while completing the study. This component has been altered in the protocol
for experiments following this preliminary phase of testing to remove the possibility of socially
induced effects on task performance. Also, the experimental design of the adapted Stroop task on
Superlab 5 was constructed with key-color associations on the right side of the keyboard, which
provides a right-hand dominant advantage for participants. In the following experiments,
participants with left-hand dominance are not included in the study, as there is a preferential
design within the present study for right hand participants. Lastly, comments from participants
following completion of the study suggest a limitation in the Stroop design itself, as a small
number of participants suggested that the primarily effective method for completion of the task
was unfocusing their attention to the word by directing attention elsewhere on the screen and
observing only the color. This strategic response method of not reading the semantic meaning of
the presented word serves as a reduction in cognitive conflict, which alters the interaction of
proactive and reactive control in response time and accuracy, and consequently, skews the data
of participants who implement this method for response.
Implications and Future Directions
The present study suggests support for the development of this adapted SRA-Stroop task
as an assessment of cognitive control, as participant performance outcomes were consistent with
the expected results of the Stroop task. The findings of the present study suggest that the adapted
SRA-Stroop task can be used to assess cognitive control in relation to extrinsic incentives, such

as feedback, and cognitive intrinsic motivation. In future directions, the study needs to include a
larger sample size, including participants from a more comprehensive background. An increase
in demographic diversity of participants is needed for an increased level of ecological validity in
assessing the relationships of feedback sensitivity, cognitive intrinsic motivation, and cognitive
control performance.
To further contextualize these results for clinical use, sample populations of individuals
with diagnosed schizophrenia, and other mental health conditions relating to cognitive control,
should be assessed. As a paradigm concerning the assessment of selective attention, the Stroop
task has often been employed to investigate attention deficits in clinical populations, such as
individuals with the diagnosis of schizophrenia (Perlstein et al., 1998, Fervaha et al., 2014). In
empirical assessments of cognitive control, decreased proactive control and increased reactive
control has been associated with individuals with schizophrenia (Barch & Ceaser, 2012;
Edwards, Barch, & Braver, 2010). Pragmatically, results from SCWT assessments of proactive
and reactive control in this clinical population advance our current understanding of the
cognitive behavioral mechanisms underlying schizophrenia. Further, these findings are
applicable for the exploration of potential assessments, interventions, and treatment strategies
related to preparatory attention and inference, conflict resolution.
Further, the findings exhibit the importance of additional study in assessing cognitive
control, as there is a significant amount of remaining unknowns related to the factors influencing
cognitive performance. Future studies could explore other motivation factors, such as the impact
from baseline measurements of other intrinsic motivation dimensions like creative or
physiological motivation. Further, assessment of additional extrinsic motivational factors, such
as the role of fear, power, or affiliation-related motivations, could yield greater insight into the

relationship of motivation and cognitive control. The examination of cognitive control, measured
by an experimental condition other than the presently adapted Stroop task, can also provide an
examination of this relationship by comparing results across a differing conflict paradigm. For
example, the implementation of an A-X continuous performance task would provide further
findings that elaborate on the focus on this study.
The present study serves as a pilot project for a study examining external, monetary
reward incentives and cognitive intrinsic motivation on performance in an adapted StimulusReward Association Stroop Task. With the establishment that this adapted Stroop task replicates
the expected Stroop Effect, further study on individual differences on cognitive performance can
be examined. The implications of these findings, with the future studies conducted with this
adapted SRA-Stroop task, are applicable to expanding our current framework of cognitive
outcomes. Assessments of cognitive control, both within and outside the clinical setting, could
approach effective intervention and compensatory strategies for individuals with deficits in
attention modulation. Further, findings that examine the addition of external motivation could be
applied within these interventions, as individuals with decreased cognitive intrinsic motivation
for goal completion could experience substantial increases with the introduction of extrinsic
factors to compensate for low motivation. These findings illuminate an understudied dynamic in
our current model and approach to cognition, alongside establishing the potential for remediation
of deficits in cognitive control that can significantly alter quality of life.
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